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ACCUMULATION-DEATH OF THE MINOR
STEWART CHAPLIN*
Under a valid New York trust for accumulation, does the income,
as it is received by the trustee, always and necessarily vest absolutely
(subject only to the trust) in the infant beneficiary and thus, in case
of his death during minority, constitute part of his estate? Or, may
the trust instrument provide that upon his death during minority
the fund then accumulated shall vest absolutely in some other
designated person? These questions form the subject of this article.
The statutes' authorize trusts for accumulation, during minority,
for the sole benefit of minors, and provide that all directions for the
accumulation of rents, profits or income, except as authorized by
statute, shall be void.2 The statutes do not use the term "sole benefit
of the minor," but such is their meaning. "We are satisfied that
the policy and language of the statute require, in order to sustain a
direction for accumulation under section 37,3 that the accumulation
must be for the sole benefit of the minor, ... ,,4 Therefore the
questions stated above resolve themselves into this form: If an in-
strument creating a trust for accumulation provides that upon the
death of the infant during minority the fund theretofore accumulated
shall go over to some other person, can it be said that the accumu-
lation is directed for the sole benefit of the minor, and that the gift
over is valid?5
*Professor of Law, New York Law School.
IN. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 51, § 6r; Ibid. c. 42, § 16.
2There are a few statutory provisions authorizing accumulation in other special
instances. See, for example, (certain charities) N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill,
1923) C. 51, § 61; Ibid. c. 42, § 16; (certain insurance premiums) Pers. Prop. L. §
16; (certain stock dividends) Pers. Prop. L. § 17 a. These have no bearing here.
31 R. S. 726, S 37, now N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 51, § 61; also
Ibid. c. 42, § r6.
4Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508, 517 (1883); Hascall v King 162 N. Y. 134,
138, 56 N. E. 515 (I9oo).
'Various classes of cases which do not fall within the scope of this article include,
for example, (a) cases where, for 4ome reason not involved in the present dis-
cussion, an attempted trust for accumulation is wholly void, and the question is,
what to do with the income that was to have been, or perhaps in fact has been,
accumulated: Pray v. Hegeman, supra note 4, at 519-520; Cook v. Lowry, 95
N. Y. 3O3, io8 (1884); Cochrane v. Schell, 34o N. Y. 516, 537-538, 35 N. E.
971 (1893); U. S. Trust Co. v. Soher, 178 N. Y. 442, 7o N. E. 970 (1904); Matter
of Hoyt, 116 App. Div. 217, 221, 222, 1O N. Y. Supp. 557 (Ist Dept. 19o6),
aff'd 189 N. Y. 51I, 81 N. E. I166 (1907). Real Prop. L., N. Y. Ann. Cons.
Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 53, § 63, which is also applicable to personal property,
Mills v. Husson, 34o N. Y. 99, 104, 35 N. E. 422 (1893); (b) cases where the
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This question has been mentioned, and various remarks have been
made about it, in a number of judicial opinions. Thus far the courts
have not furnished any clear and decisive answer. The cases now to
be referred to have been selected as representative.
In Bolton v. Jacks,6 the will provided that if Laura, the beneficiary
of a trust for accumulation, should die during minority, "my estate"
should go to P. B. Laura had not died during minority. It was not
held that the gift over of the "estate" was intended to include any
accumulated income. But the court, assuming for mere purposes of
discussion that it was so intended, stated its view that such a gift
over would be valid. The reason it gives may be summarized as
follows: The accumulated fund cannot, in such a case, be paid to the
infant; such a disposition has been rendered impossible by an act
of God; yet the fund must go somewhere; unless the testator could
provide for a payment of it to someone else, it would-the court
says-'"revert back" to the testator's estate; and the court adds:
"But there is no reason why a testator should not have the power to
anticipate such an event, and treat the accumulated fund as a part of
his original estate, and devise it to such person as he chooses."
Now in any ordinary use of the words, the accumulated fund
was not a part of the testator's "original estate." It was not in any
sense in existence when he died. " It is true that in many connections
the law does permit a testator to direct the disposition of income to
arise after his death. But from this it does not necessarily follow that
in trusts for accumulation it does permit him to direct that in case
of the death of the infant beneficiary during minority the accumulated
fund shall go over to some other person. And here, on the question
whether it does or does not give him that power, comes in the feature
that it is only under a special statutory provision that the accumu-
lation itself can be directed at all. And that provision strictly con-
fines such directions to accumulations for the sole benefit of an in-
creator of the trust has attempted to direct the dispositioh of the accumulated
fund after the infant has attained majority: Pray v. Hegeman, supra; Barbour v.
De Forest, 95 N. Y. 13 (1884); and (c) cases where the trust instrument merely
directs an accumulation for the infant during minority, and does not attempt to
make any gift over. The question of apportionment of ,income is also not in
point here. See matter of Tuillard, 238 N. Y. 499, 5io, 144 N. E. 772 (1924).
6 Robt. 166, 230 (N. Y. i868). See also Gilman v. Hlealy, I Dem. 404, 408
(N. Y. i882). In Harris v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 242, 260 (1852), the court held that
such a gift over was not allowable: "the accumulations directed are not for the
benefit of minors exclusively." But for various reasons the decision should per-
haps be regarded as more or less indecisive.
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fant. That this "sole benefit" feature does exclude any authority
thus to make a gift over of the accumulated fund, receives a certain
amount of support from express decisions which, though not in-
volving an attempted gift over in case of the infant's death during
minority, have held that the statutory term "benefit of a minor,"
in the accumulation statutes, is to be strictly and literally con-
strued to exclude any benefit directed for other persons, and to
involve absolute vesting of the accumulations in the infant, subject
only to the trust while it lasts.
For it is now settled that a direction to accumulate until an in-
fant's majority or earlier death, for the benefit of an infant and an-
other person-for example its mother-is void, because not for
the sole benefit of a minor;7 that a gift over of an accumulated fund
in case the beneficiary dies after coming of age is void, because the
direction for accumulation would not be for the sole benefit of an
infant;8 and that if the creator of a trust for accumulation does not
attempt to make any gift over in case of the infant's death during
minority, the accumulations-as being permitted only for his sole
benefit-vest absolutely, subject only to the trust, in the infant as
they are received by the trustee, and upon his death during mi-
nority form part of his estate.9
An argument somewhat similar to that offered by the court in
Bolton v. Jacks,10 might be stated as follows: The accumulated fund
must go somewhere; if not disposed of by the creator of the trust,
the law will dispose of it to others; such a disposition by the law
would not contravene the requirement concerning the sole benefit
of the infant; then why should it contravene that requirement to
allow the creator of the trust, upon the same contingency, to dispose
of it by a gift over? One defect in that argument is this: It is not
true that just because "the law" will dispose of property on a given
contingency, therefore the creator of the trust is also at liberty,
upon the same contingency, to dispose of it. For all the statutes
relating to suspension of alienability and to postponement of vesting
deal solely with what may or may not be directed by a grantor or
testator. They forbid him to do certain things. But naturally they
7 Matter of Rogers, 22 App. Div. 428, 431, 48 N. Y. Supp. 175 (2d. Dept.
1897), aff'd i61 N. Y. io8, 55 N. E. 393 (1899); Matter of Murphy, 213 App.
Div. 319, 322, 21o N. Y. Supp. 531 (2d Dept. 1925).
pray v. Hegeman, supra note 4, at 517-519; Barbour v. De Forest. supra
note 5.
'Smith v. Parsons, 146 N. Y. 116, 4o N. E. 736 (1895), aff'g 75 Hun, 155, 26
N. Y. Supp. io87 (Sup. Ct. ist Dept. 1894), sub norm. Smith v. Campbell,
"6Supra note 6.
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do not prohibit results that occur automatically under the general
law of the land. For example, if property is devised or bequeathed
absolutely to an infant, he is under a legal disability which effects, in
a sense, a suspension of the full power to alienate, but the statute
relating to suspension is not aimed at such a case. It "is aimed
only at suspension by the terms of the will."'" And under a grant in
fee determinable on a remote contingency, the law may recognize an
interest of a reversionary nature in the grantor. A reversion is not
created by the grantor. But if the grantor had attempted to create a
remainder to vest upon the happening of the remote contingency,
it would be void. 2 And if, under a valid trust for accumulation,
the infant does come of age and so acquires actual possession of the
accumulated fund as his absolute property, and later dies without
disposing of it, "it must go somewhere," and "the law" gives it to
his next of kin. But the creator of the trust could not have directed
its disposition in that event." And this distinction is observed in
the statutes relating to accumulations. The statutes say that all
directions for accumulation, except as allowed by statute, shall be
void; that an accumulation may be directed as there provided. Thus
the fact that where there is no direction for the disposition of the ac-
cumulated fund upon the infant's death during minority it must in
fact pass automatically to others, does not in any way imply that
the creator of the trust could have directed that in that event it
should pass to persons designated by him.
The general drift of judicial opinion, however, in cases where the
question of power to direct a gift over has been mentioned, appears
to favor the existence of such a power in the creator of the trust.
In Willets v. Titus,4 the will created a trust to "hand out" the
property to the beneficiary during minority, and provided that
whatever was left, at majority, was to be hers, or, if she died during
minority, then "said real and personal property" was to go to her
issue if any, and otherwise to other persons. The infant did die
during minority, leaving no issue. Some income had been accu-
mulated. The court did not decide that this testamentary scheme
"Matter of Trevor, 239 N. Y. 6, I6, 145 N. E. 66 (1924).
"See Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (i9o9); Walker v. Mar-
cellus &c. Ry., 226 N. Y. 347, 123 N. E. 736 (I919).
1Pray v. Hegeman, supra note 4, at 517; Barbour v. De Forest, supra note 5.
See also Livingston v. Tucker, 107 N. Y. 549, 552, 14 N. B. 443 (1887).
"'14 Hun, 554 (1878).
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involved any direction for the accumulation of income,15 but merely
assuming, for purposes of argument, that it did so, it said that in
that case a provision for a gift over of the accumulated fund to
others, upon the infant's death during minority, would be valid.
In Goebel v Wolf,'8 property was devised in trust to hold it in four
separate shares representing the testator's four children, and to
accumulate for each child, during its minority, the income of its
respective share. 17 The shares themselves were, subject to the trusts,
given also, as of the testator's death, to the respective children.
One of them died durng minority. For this contingency, the will
made no express provision. The court held' s that the income al-
ready in fact accumulated for the benefit of the deceased infant,
passed at his death to his "next of kin."
In Roe v. Vingut,'9 there was a testamentary trust to accumulate
the income of separate shares for the benefit of several infants during
their respective minorities. As construed by the court the will pro-
vided that if a minor should die during minority, his share, including
its accumulated income, should then go outright to his issue, if any,
and otherwise to the surviving beneficiaries of the other shares.
The court said: "Such a provision for the disposition of an accu-
mulation for the benefit of an infant, in case of his death, is good."
It is to be noticed, however, that none of the infants had died; and
that the "questions propounded"'2 did not involve the validity of
the gift over of the accumulations, but only the point whether, on an
infant's death, they would vest absolutely somewhere, free of the
trust.21
We come now to Smith v. Parsons." In that case there was a
testamentary trust to receive the income of two separate shares;
"See Matter of Hoyt, supra note 5; Bloodgood v. Lewis, 209 N. Y. 95, 102
N. E. 6xo (1913); Hill v. Guaranty Trust Co., 163 App. Div, 374, 148 N. Y.
Supp. 6oi (ist Dept. 1914); Crawford v. Dexter, 178 App. Div. 764, 166 N. Y.
Supp. 376 (ist Dept. 1917), aff'd 224 N. Y. 586, i=O N. E. 860 (z918).
16113 N. Y. 405, 415, 21 N. E. 388 (1889). This was an action for construction
of the will.
"
7Special further provisions concerning the trust term and its validity were
excluded from consideration, and have no bearing here.
'sSupra note i6, at 415.
19117 N. Y.204, 217, 22 N. E. 933 (i889). This was an action for construction
of the will.
2OAs stated by the court, at 211.
"Also, the court cite as authority for their statement above quoted, the case of
Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303, 375 (1870), where the opinion does not say any-
thing about any gift over of any accumulated fund, but deals with the disposition
of the corpus.
"'Supra note 9.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
to apply to the use of the testator's two infant daughters respectively
the income of one share or so much thereof as the trustees might
deem necessary; and to accumulate the rest of the income of each
share until the majority or earlier death of its beneficiary; at the ma-
jority of each to pay to her the fund accumulated on her share;
and, on the death of either during minority to pay her "share" to her
sister if then surviving, and otherwise to other persons. Martha,
one of' the daughters, died during minority, unmarried and intestate.
Income had been accumulated on her share. The question was,
whether this accumulated fund had vested absolutely in the de-
ceased infant, and so passed, through her administratrix, to her
mother and sister; or had, in the event that had occurred, been
given over by the testator's will as part of the "share," to the in-
fant's sister alone.' As to this latter point, the court held that the
word "share," as used in the will, referred to principal only, and was
not intended to include any accumulation of income. Thus the case
did not present any question of the validity of a gift over. No such
gift had been attempted. What was decided was, that the income
had vested absolutely (subject to the trust) in the infant as it ac-
crued, and therefore formed part of her estate. But the court did
also consider the question whether the creator of such a trust could
make a gift over of the accumulated fund. It is important, there-
fore, in reading the portions of the opinion now to be quoted, to dis-
tinguish between what was decided, on the question before the court,
and what was said concerning a question not before the court for de-
cision.? For convenience of reference the following passages from
the opinion are numbered, and a few words are italicized.
(i) "The single question presented by this appeal is whether the
accumulations of income upon Martha's share vested as they were
paid in, or was the vesting postponed until she attained the age of
twenty-one years." The opinion proceeds to consider (a) the testa-
mentary intent, and (b) the policy of the statute. The court held
that it was the testator's intention that all accumulations of income
during minority should vest in the infant at once, and that only
the time of payment or enjoyment was postponed. They add:
(2) "We do not, however, share the doubts expressed by the
learned General Term 6 as to the testator's power to make such dis-
33See the opinion below, 75 Hun, 155, 157, 26 N. Y. Supp. 1o87 (Sup. Ct.
Ist Dept. 1894).
2U"It is always to be remembered that broad general statements in any opinion
are to be read in connection with the facts of the particular case before the court."
Matter of Green v. Miller, 249 N. Y. 88, 97 N. E. 593 (1928).
25Smith v. Parsons, supra note 9, at i19.
26Supra note 23, at 161.
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position of the accumulated income of an infant dying during mi-
nority as he might see fit; there is no legal objection to bequeathing the
same to any person whether a minor or of full age, and such a pro-
vision in a will would not violate the statute which provides that accu-
mulations must be for the benefit of minors.2 7 When a minor dies,
for whose benefit accumulations of income have been directed, it is
competent for the testator to dispose of them in the same manner as
any other portion of his estate, provided they have not vested in the
infant as paid in.28
(3) "While we rest our decision in this case on the provisions of the
will, we are also of opinion that it is the policy of the law permitting
the accumulations of personal property for the benefit of a minor
(i R. S. 773, S 3)29 that they should vest in the infant beneficially when
received, and it is only payment over that is postponed until the
expiration of the minority. 0 This construction of the statute finds
confirmation in the provision (i R. S. 774, S 5) [Pers. Prop. L. S 17;
Real. Prop. L. S 62] to the effect that where any minor, for whose
benefit a valid accumulation of the interest or income of personal
property shall have been directed, shall be destitute of other suffi-
cient means of support or of education, the chancellor may cause a
suitable sum to be taken from the moneys accumulated, or directed
to be accumulated, to be supplied to the support or education of such
minor.1,31
Thus the opinion says that it is competent for a testator so to
dispose of the accumulations, on the infant's death during minority,
provided they have not vested in the infant as paid in; and also, that
it is the policy of the law that they shall so vest, and that it is only
payment that is postponed. The net result of these two statements is
obscure. They may mean, for example, (a) that the policy of the law
applies to all directions for accumulation, and does not permit any
gift over; or, (b) that the policy of the law applies only where, as in
Smith v. Parsons, there is no gift over, and that the power of the
creator of the trust to make such a gift over is absolute.32 In any
27See also Hodgman v. Cobb, 2o2 App. Div. 259, 266, 195 N. Y. Supp. 428
(3d Dept. 1922).
28Smith v. Parsons, supra note 9, at 120.
29N. Y. Ann. Cons. (Cahill, 1923) c. 42, § 16; Ibid c. 51, § 61.
20See also Draper v. Palmer, 27 N. Y. S. R. 510 (Sup. Ct. Ist Dept. 1889).
2lSupra note 9, at 121. See also Pray v. Hegeman, supra note 4, at 516.
=In Hodgman v. Cobb, supra note 27, at 266, the court seems to understand
the opinion in this sense (b). But the reference above quoted from Smith v.
Parsons, to the statutes permitting application of accumulations for the infant's
support and education appears to support the meaning stated in view (a).
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event, it is certain that on the question of power to make a gift over,
Smith v. Parsons does not furnish any actual decision, for no such
gift over had been attempted.
Perhaps some light may be thrown on the general subject under
discussion, by casting in a novel form an attempted gift over of the
accumulated fund, as follows: "The trustee shall accumulate the in-
come until the majority or earlier death of A (the infant), and upon
the termination of the trust to accumulate he shall pay over and
convey the property, including the fund so accumulated, to B (an
adult), except upon the contingency that A does in fact attain his
inajority, in which latter case the trustee shall convey and pay
the property, including the accumulations, to A." It is very prob-
able, to say the least, that such a provision-at any rate so far as
concerns the provisions for the adult-would be held invalid as not
being for the sole benefit of the infant. And yet it will be noticed
that the imagined form undertakes, in every possible contingency,
to dispose of the accumulated fund in exactly the same manner as if
it had been made payable to the infant at his majority, or, if he
should earlier die, to the adult. Now it would not seem likely that
the law, as between two forms of provision for the adult, identical in
operation, would on a bare difference in phraseology hold one void
and the other valid.3
The foregoing review of the cases indicates that the question here
under discussion has not as yet received any final answer. It also
indicates that the courts have leaned, more or less indecisively, to
the view that the creator of a trust for accumulation may provide
for a gift over of'the accumulated fund if the infant dies during
minority.
But when the question does come up squarely for decision, it is
quite possible that such a gift over will be held void. The several
reasons on which such a conclusion might well be based, are gathered
together and separately restated in the successive remaining para-
graphs of this article, as follows:
That under the statutes the accumulation must be directed for
the sole benefit of the minor; and that one element of sole benefit
consists in absolute and indefeasible vesting of the accumulations
(subject only to the trust) in the infant as received by the trustee,
with the resultant right to have the accumulated fund, if he dies
even before majority, go to his next of kin as such, or, if he is old
3See Pray v. Hegeman, supra note 4, at 517.
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enough, though a minor, to make a will of personal property,34 to
those to whom he may bequeath it.
That the effect of a gift over would be, in real substance, to direct
the accumulation upon only one contingency for the minor and
upon another contingency for another person; that such a con-
struction of the statute would open the door to evasions of its obvious
purpose."
That the fact that on the minor's death the accumulated fund
must go somewhere, has no bearing on the question whether the cre-
ator of the trust may direct where it shall go.
That it is already settled, where no gift over is attempted, that
the accumulations do (subject only to the trust while it lasts) vest
absolutely in the infant, and on his death form part of his estate;
and that the reasons on which this conclusion is based apply with
equal force where a gift over is attempted, and thus render that
gift void.
That such indefeasible vesting in the minor readily answers to a
simple and natural reading of the statutory requirement.
That an opposite view must be supported, if at all, by reading
something into the statute which it does not express. It would
interpret the statute as if it said: "for the benefit of a minor or, in
case of his death during minority, for the benefit of any person,
minor or adult, designated by the trust instrument to then receive
the accumulated fund." None of the familiar reasons which some-
times warrant the reading in of words, has any application to this
case.
That if the legislature had intended to permit a gift over, it could
readily have said so. It did not say so.
That the supposed status of the fund as a part of the original
estate of the creator of the trust is illusory. He never owned it.
It did not exist at his death. No statute provides that he can create
or dispose of it at all, except for the sole benefit of the infant.
That exceptions to sweeping statutory requirements representing
a broad public policy should be based only upon considerations which
are highly persuasive and fairly controlling.
That the statutes providing for applications from the accumu-
lations, to the infant's use in case of need, lend important support
to the absoluteness, subject to the trust, of his ownership of the fund
as it arises, and to the view that upon his death it passes to his
estate, and that accordingly, and pursuant to the general policy
of the law, any attempted gift over to another person is void.
4N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (Cahil, 1923) c. 13, § 15.
36See Pray v. Hegeman, supra note 4, at 517.
